Country output and financial black holes: public–private partnerships and the Laffer curve, fiscal corruption risk, and bailout rate of non-performing loans by Saisomphorn Larhsoukanh & Chengzhang Wang
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rero20
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rero20
Country output and financial black holes:
public–private partnerships and the Laffer curve,
fiscal corruption risk, and bailout rate of non-
performing loans
Saisomphorn Larhsoukanh & Chengzhang Wang
To cite this article: Saisomphorn Larhsoukanh & Chengzhang Wang (2020) Country output and
financial black holes: public–private partnerships and the Laffer curve, fiscal corruption risk, and
bailout rate of non-performing loans, Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 33:1, 540-554,
DOI: 10.1080/1331677X.2020.1718523
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2020.1718523
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 02 Mar 2020.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 346
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Country output and financial black holes: public–private
partnerships and the Laffer curve, fiscal corruption risk,
and bailout rate of non-performing loans
Saisomphorn Larhsoukanh and Chengzhang Wang
School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Sichuan, China
ABSTRACT
This study develops the link between output and fiscal corruption
risk in public–private partnership (PPP) schemes and the govern-
ment bailout rate of non-performing loans (NPLs). The model
assumes that corruption is widespread in such public investment
programs. The objective functions of the government and PPP
firms include fiscal corruption risk, given that the PPP firm and
tax inspector can ‘effectively’ negotiate bribes. The model solves
for the optimal country output (i.e., aggregate productivity)
according to the Lagrange method. Long-term prospects are
introduced to solve the problem with commercial banks, as most
PPPs borrow from commercial banks. The results reaffirm that tax
policy can exacerbate the country’s output loss. Although the
equilibria between aggregate productivity and the Laffer curve
lack a direct link to fiscal corruption risk, their magnitude does
and depends on the number of PPPs. The PPP transfer from the
government in period 2 and the number of PPPs rather than gov-
ernment expenditure in period 1 and the Laffer curve (tax reve-
nues) mainly determines the bailout rate of PPPs’ NPLs. The article
concludes with suggestions to prevent tax evasion and fiscal cor-
ruption risk in PPP schemes by using a cluster of cooperation, and
recommends further research into cultural aspects.
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The recent literature on fiscal policy demonstrates the role of fiscal corruption on tax
evasion in quantifying its effects on state tax revenues. Camous and Gimber (2018)
determine the effect of fiscal austerity and emphasise that the austerity measure can
be based on aggregate productivity and the Laffer curve if an endogenous decrease in
government spending is in the retrenchment process (Korpi & Palme, 2003) and the
government implements fiscal austerity (Sau, 2018). However, as many countries jus-
tify their expenses on the grounds of tax collection and debt issuance, it would be
practical to focus on public debt management and fiscal corruption. Consequently,
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this study looks at public debt management, specifically the bailout rate of non-
performing loans (NPLs) and the aggregate productivity in countries forging pub-
lic–private partnerships (PPPs) when tax evasion is subject to fiscal corruption risk
(or constraint) and when these countries consider the PPPs as an alternative for
reducing public debt (Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2013); (National Assembly, 2018).
We assume that these countries launch a series of fiscal policy tools in period 1
(i.e., a short-term tactic), and implement the policy statement in period 2 (the long-
term prospects).
NPLs due to corruption in PPP projects1 make public debt management more dif-
ficult, so the model introduces the government bailout rate of NPLs h2ð Þ in period 2
to solve the problem with commercial banks, as most PPP projects borrow money
from commercial banks, as in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, where its central
bank proposes h2 ¼ 0:65 0:7 (Lao Prime Minister, 2014). This study then examines
whether a common device to implement fiscal austerity (i.e., h2) that restricts monet-
ary supply to stabilise inflation based on supply side economics (Xi, 2017) can meet
the height of the Laffer curve or a certain level of government expenditure G1ð Þ in
period 1 (Camous & Gimber, 2018; Prati & Tressel, 2006). We provide motivation to
the study in Figure 1.
The results confirm the existence of a procyclical tax policy in the model. Tax pol-
icy can exacerbate the output loss (i.e., low aggregate productivity), both in the short
and long run, as the higher number PPP projects is, the lower the aggregate product-
ivity is. We also find that h2 is determined by the PPP transfer from a government
Figure 1. The flow chart stimulated by our model.
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(public debt) in period 2 and the total number of PPP projects rather than govern-
ment expenditure G1ð Þ in period 1 or the Laffer curve (tax revenues). Moreover, in
terms of tax evasion, other PPP firms could be free riders on the punishment for dis-
covered and evaded taxes, and thus a cluster of cooperation is necessary (Luo &
Zhao, 2013). The authors extend the model accordingly and find that if the punish-
ment rate for tax inspectors is characterised by the high and low amount of discov-
ered and evaded taxes, then the reverting punishment rate for the PPP firm describes
the steady state of the fiscal policy.
This study is based on the work of Camous and Gimber (2018), who focus on the
cyclicality of tax policy and public debt management in the absence of fiscal corrup-
tion.2 The main contribution of this study is that it emphasises the role of fiscal
corruption risk in a more realistic context of public debt management in countries
encouraging PPPs. This study also offers a new perspective on ‘legal tax avoidance’
(Mankiw (2007) rather than tax evasion, as firm can employ tax lawyers and account-
ants to handle tax avoidance (see Definition 3).
This study extends Vasin’s (1999) model, which explores the interaction of tax
inspectors and taxpayers using a monetary punishment for poor quality audits under
complete information. A key difference between the model in the present study and
Vasin’s (1999) model is in terms of fiscal corruption. The present study focuses on
bargaining outcomes, as Svensson (2005) and Cerqueti and Coppier (2016) note that
taxpayers and tax inspectors can ‘effectively’ negotiate bribes in the absence of con-
tracts. Vasin’s (1999) model includes the punishment rate for PPP firms for dishonest
behaviour in the evaded taxes. The model in this study instead assumes that both the
punishment rates for PPP firms and tax inspectors are embedded in fiscal policy and
fiscal corruption risk, as Definition 3 explains in detail.
In prior studies, Cerqueti and Coppier (2016) build a theorectical game model to
investigate tax collection in a multiethnic country with incomplete information.
Under specific circumstances, taxpayers (i.e., PPP firms) and tax inspectors seem
unconcerned about punishments for tax evasion. However, the results in the present
study indicate partial support for that study’s Propositions concerning the relation-
ship between tax revenue (fiscal policy) and the punishment rate for tax inspectors
based on an evolutionary game (i.e., concerning free riders). Specifically, when the
cluster of cooperation is formed by the payoff distribution (Luo & Zhao, 2013), the
fiscal policy can define an equilibrium.
This study is related to the extensive literature on corruption. Few game theorists
examine the negative impact of corruption on specific functions. Zhang, Bao, and
Skitmore (2015) examine land hoarding issues in China with real estate developers
and land inspectors representing the players of the game. Verma, Nandi, and
Sengupta (2017) focus on social conflict between government servants and citizens in
an assymetric game. Given anti-corruption measures, Mishra (2006) finds that cor-
ruption is persistent and may be the social norm. Verma and Sengupta (2015) investi-
gate harassment corruption when citizens pay bribes to officers. However, these
researchers compare the asymmetric penalty on corrupt officers to the sysmetric pen-
alty programs, regardless of bargaining outcomes. Although this study applies a bar-
gaining game based on Cerqueti and Coppier (2016), it explores the relationship
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between progressive taxation and the punishment rate for tax inspectors when com-
plete information and symmetric bribe conditions prevail. Notably, game theoretical
applications for tax corruption are still immature, as this study is one of the first to
apply the model to understand some unsolved problems regarding corruption, such
as the bailout rate of NPLs.
Finally, in a more economics-focused paper, Shi (2019) defines intolerance as back-
ing corruption and slowing economic growth. However, the present study focuses on
public debt management (i.e., determining the bailout rate of NPLs) in countries pro-
moting PPP projects, for which both the punishment rates for the PPP firm and tax
inspector are embedded in fiscal policy and the fiscal corruption risk. Notably, cor-
ruption limits economic growth (Svensson, 2005); Therefore, solving this issue poten-
tially benefits the PPP firm, government, and ordinary citizens.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the model, describes
the government and PPP firm’s optimisation problem, and states the solution
method. Section 3 discusses public debt management, defines fiscal corruption risk,
suggests a strategy to prevent tax evasion and corruption in PPP scheme by applying
a cluster of cooperation, and offers policy recommendations on public debt manage-
ment. The final section concludes.
2. Model
The model focuses on PPPs (Iossa & Martimort, 2015) in a small open economy
(Camous & Gimber, 2018), expressed in discrete time between periods 1 and 2. The
late period covers the long-term commitment.
2.1. Firm’s objective function
The representative private sector’s general objective function is an extension of a
model of the PPP transfer from the government based on Prati and Tressel (2006)
model, which maximises the expected discounted profit in period 2. Let pPPP and p1
be the private sector’s expected profits from the PPP project and in period 1, respect-
ively. Let TR1 and TR2 be the transfer from the government in periods 1 and 2,
respectively (Prati & Tressel, 2006). The PPP firm prefers the transfer to the bribery
and corruption risk (b). Following previous work on profit functions in PPPs, the
PPP firm’s problem is:
max
TR1
pPPP ¼ p1  b þ TR1, (1)
subject to:
1rð Þh2TR1 ¼ TR2  A2:
The optimal bribe b is provided (see Section 4.2). r is the nominal interest rate.
Notably, h2 2 0, 1ð Þ is the bailout rate of the PPP’s NPLs proposed by the
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government, as commercial banks receive a guarantee of TR1 from a (local) govern-
ment. A2 is foreign aid such as official development assistance (Prati & Tressel, 2006).
2.2. Government’s maximisation problem
This study analyses two forms of the model, each related to a unique set of fiscal instru-
ments and fiscal disciplines. In the first form, the government attempts to prevent fiscal
corruption by employing a punishment rate for the PPP firm and tax inspector in the
amount of the discovered and evaded taxes (see Section 4.2). In the second form, as in
Laos, a government protects the affected domestic commercial banks by introducing h2
in period 2. Let s1 and z1 be the profit tax rate and the contemporaneous productivity
3
in period 1, respectively. Let C1 be provided by the Laffer curve s1z1C1: Thus, the opti-
misation problem of the government, as an extension of equations 5 to 7 of Camous and
Gimber (2018), and equation 28 of Cerqueti and Coppier (2016), is:
max
hG
C1  Nbb þ NPPPTR2, (2)
subject to the government’s budget constraints, as follows:
TR1 þ G1  s1z1C1 þ TR2RG
TR2  B2,
where NPPP is the total number of PPP projects; Nb is the number of failed PPP proj-
ects; that is, the PPP projects alleged to engage in fiscal corruption or tax evasion in
the country; G1 is the short-run public expenditure; RG is the government’s risk-free
(interest) rate at which it lends between periods 1 and 2; and B2 is the borrowing
limitation (i.e., public debt ceiling).
2.3. Solution method
This study uses an optimisation method to resolve the model for a nonlinear relation-
ship. The optimised solution is typically composed of maximising or minimising an
objective function. The analysis here uses input values and computes the optimal val-
ues for the function by using the first- and second-order derivatives of the objective
function. The optimisation condition is often an abstract concept. In mathematics, it
is possible to visualise an optimal point as the highest place on a hilltop or the lowest
point in a valley, or ‘the quest for the best’ (Chiang & Wainwright, 2005). Moreover,
the optimal point on a hilltop or in a valley is called the ‘local maximum or local
minimum’, respectively. However, another definition exists, called the ‘absolute (or
global) extremum’. The model first contains fiscal corruption risk and the Laffer
curve4 to solve for the optimal aggregate productivity according to the Lagrange
method. Please see Chiang and Wainwright (2005) for more detail on the solution
method. The authors propose an algorithm to refine the model, as shown in Figure 1.
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3. Result
This section provides the technical details of the comprehensive solution that focuses
on fiscal corruption risk. In public debt management, a sudden decrease in h2 makes
the PPP firm face financial difficulties, especially in period 2, as their profits tend to
decrease. This is a common device in the literature to implement the fiscal austerity
and can restrict the monetary supply to stabilise inflation based on supply side eco-
nomics and the Laffer curve (Xi, 2017).
Theorem. In a PPP, the aggregate productivity z1ð Þ in period 1 based on the Laffer
curve is:
z1 ¼ TR1s1RGNPPP (3)
Proof. Given an initial level of public debt in period 1, or TR1, which represents the
PPP transfer from the government (Iossa & Martimort, 2015) and the Laffer curve
C1, then an equilibrium of this economy consists of b, h2, G1, r, z1f g such that:
i. b, h2f g solves the PPP firm’s problem, and
ii. G1, z1f g solves the government’s problem.
It is straightforward to show that an equilibrium can be characterised by
pPPP, ‘1, b
, h2, G1, r, z1f g
satisfying the following equation:
1rð Þh2TR1 þ A2
RG
þ s1z1C1  TR1 þ G1ð Þ  0: (4)
Provided that TR2 ¼ 1rð Þh2TR1 þ A2, which is the constraint of equation (1),
then ‘1 is the Lagrange function characterising the implementable equilibrium in
period 1 in the form:
‘1 ¼ C1  Nbb þ NPPP 1rð Þh2TR1 þ A2ð Þ
þ k1 1r
ð Þh2TR1 þ A2
RG
þ s1z1C1 TR1 þ G1ð Þ
 
þ k2b : (5)
Given the vector of Lagrange multipliers (i.e., k1 and k2) and equation (5), the
aggregate productivity satisfying the first-order necessary conditions is:
o‘1
oC1
¼ C01 þ k1s1z1C01 ¼ 0
o‘1
ob
¼ Nbb0 þ k2b0 ¼ 0
o‘1
oTR1
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The second-order derivative is used to check if an optimal solution is achievable,
and results in o2‘1=oC21 ¼ 1þ k1s1z1 > 0: This is a sufficient condition for the min-






The result is proved w
The theorem reaffirms the procyclicality of tax policy (see Figure 2 and its param-
eter in Table 1). Specifically, tax policy can exacerbate output as the higher the num-
ber of PPP projects is, the lower the aggregate productivity is.
4. Discussion
4.1. The bailout rate of NPLs and financial black holes
Given the constraints of equations 1ð Þ and 3ð Þ :
h2 ¼ TR2A21rð Þs1z1RGNPPP : (6)
If h2  RG TR1þG1s1z1C1ð ÞA21rð ÞTR1 , then from the constraints of equations (1) and (2) ver-
sus that from equation 6ð Þ, Definition 1 provides a policy recommendation.
Definition 1. In a PPP, the bailout rate of NPLs h2ð Þ is mainly determined by the
PPP transfer from the government TR2ð Þ and the total number of PPP projects
NPPPð Þ in a country with long-term prospects rather than short-term government
expenditure G1ð Þ as a tactic or the Laffer curve s1z1C1ð Þ:
Figure 2. Procyclicity of tax policy. The R-code is provided in appendix A.
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In other words, although the main motivation of this study is to understand the
mathematical model assumptions and background in countries promoting PPPs,5
determining the value for h2 is subject to debate and a vote in a National Assembly;
that is, to enact law and regulations rather than to seek a short-term solution.
However, h2, a revised version of ‘helicopter drop’ for a PPP, can contravene
financial regulation and cause financial black holes, as negative NPV projects are pub-
licly financed (Ranciere & Tornell, 2011).
4.2. Financial black holes and bargained corruption
As fiscal corruption can cause financial black holes, this study also addresses several related
research questions. Should the fiscal corruption risk between the PPP firm and the tax
inspector find a corresponding discrepancy between the PPP firm and the government, or
between the tax inspector and itself? Should the optimal solutions be an immediate prac-
tical alternative? First, note that b is the value for the unique bribe for tax evasion.
Definition 2. In a progressive tax system, let DH and DL be the higher and lower lev-
els of the basis discount on the annual profit tax, respectively. The optimal bribe bð Þ
can be calculated as:
b ¼ qþ að Þs1DH þ 1s1ð Þ DHDLð Þ
2
, (7)
where q and a are the punishment rates for the PPP firm and tax inspector, respect-
ively, on the amount of discovered and evaded taxes DHð Þ:
Proof. Let w denote the fixed wage of a tax inspector, and w > 0: Table 2 provides
an example. In Laos, if a firm’s real profit ranks between 3,600,001 and 8,000,000
Kip6 per year (row 3), the basis discount stipulated in the tax law is 4,400,000 Kip. In
Table 1. Parameterisation.
Parameter Description Parameter value Source
TR1 The transfer from a government in period 1
(i.e., public debt)
9,300 bil. http://vientianetimes.org.la/
TR2 The transfer from a government in period 2
(i.e., government bonds)
https://laoedaily.com.la
GDP Gross Domestic Product 140,749 bil. Lao National assembly
C1 Tax revenues (16.7% of GDP) in 2018
which is as period 1.
23505 bil. Lao National assembly
z1 The aggregate productivity in period 1 300
s1 Profit tax rate 0.05-1.0
NPPP The total number of PPP projects 1,225 http://vientianetimes.org.la/
qlo ,alo Low punishment rate for PPP firm and tax
inspector, respectively, on the amount of
discovered and evaded taxes DHð Þ
0.1
qhi ,ahi High punishment rate for PPP firm
and tax inspector, respectively, on the amount
of discovered and evaded taxes DHð Þ
0.9
DH The higher level of the basis discount
of annual profit tax
15Mil. Laos’s Tax law
DL The lower level of the basis discount
of annual profit tax
10Mil Laos’s Tax law
p1 PPP firm’s expected profit in period 1 50% of TR1
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this profit rank, if the firm reports its real profit, then the basis discount is the higher
one; that is, DH ¼ 4, 400, 000: However, if the firm underreports profit by referring to
the lower basis discount (i.e., DL ¼ 3, 600, 000), then it successfully evades profit tax.
This practice is ‘legal tax avoidance’ according to Mankiw (2007) because the PPP
firm can employ tax lawyers and accountants to handle these affairs (i.e., seeking to
convert DH to DL). However, this study takes the behaviour toward illegal tax evasion
as an offered and accepted bribe bð Þ:
Figure 3 depicts the PPP firm and the tax inspector as in a two-person bargaining
game. The firm moves first and offers the bribe bð Þ: In this case, the PPP firm tends
to underreport its profit DLð Þ and has the game outcome of DL þ b s1DL  qsDH:
The payoff for the tax inspector is wþ b as1DH: In Laos, s1 ¼
0, 0:05, 0:1, 0:15, 0:2, 0:24f g (column 3 of Table 2). Note that the tax inspector’s
decision can influence the outcome of the game based on backward induction.
Clearly, the game can be solved by the subgame perfect equilibrium, which
signifies the Nash bargaining solution for the symmetric bribe. As a game with
complete information, the solution to the game is to obtain the payoff vector
½ DL þ bsDLqsDHð Þ, wþ basDHð Þ: Note that first and second payoffs belong to
the PPP firm and tax inspector, respectively. The disagreement point is the payoff





Rate s1ð Þ Profit Tax
Equal or less than 3,600,000 3,600,000 0% 0
3,600,001 to 8,000,000 4,400,000 5% 220,000
8,000,001 to 15,000,000 7,000,000 10% 700,000
15,000,001 to 25,000,000 10,000,000 15% 1,500,000
25,000,001 to 40,000,000 15,000,000 20% 3,000,000
Equal or more than 40,000,001 … 24% …
Figure 3. Bargaining the bribe and various payoffs based on Table 2.
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vector ½ DHsDHð Þ,w: In short, the solution is to find an optimal bribe bð Þ result-
ing from Nash bargaining fNash; therefore:
maximize fNash ¼ DL þ bsDLqs1DHð Þ DHs1DHð Þ
 
wþ bas1DHð Þw½ 
maximize fNash ¼ bqs1DHð Þ þ 1s1ð ÞDL 1s1ð ÞDH
 
bas1DHð Þ




Next, the first-order derivative of equation 8ð Þ with respect to b in period 1 produces:
of
ob
¼ bqs1DH 1s1ð Þ DHDLð Þ þ bas1DH
of
ob
¼ 2b qþ að Þs1DH 1s1ð Þ DHDLð Þ
Based on the second-order derivative, o2f =ob2 ¼ 2 > 0: This is the minimum b:
Next, the optimal answer is obtained from of =ob ¼ 0: Specifically:
2b ¼ qþ að Þs1DH þ 1s1ð Þ DHDLð Þ
w
4.3. The cluster of cooperation to prevent tax evasion, fiscal corruption,
and financial black holes in PPP projects
Failed PPP projects can be prevented by a cluster of co-operators (Luo & Zhao, 2013)
when the punishment rates for discovered evaded taxes are applied. Accordingly, the
higher the punishment rates are, the higher the cooperation level is.
Definition 3. With the PPP’s cluster of cooperation (Luo & Zhao, 2013), let qhi and
qlo be the punishment rate for the PPP firm on the high and low amount of discov-
ered and evaded taxes, respectively; let ahi and alo be the punishment rate for the tax
inspector on the high and low amount of discovered and evaded taxes, respectively.
For all qlo < 1 alo, there exist a unique equilibrium.
Proof. Tax evasion in PPP projects can be prevented by solving the game in Figure 4.
The arrows on the left and right pointing up (Figure 4 [1]) show that the PPP firm
prefers a high punishment to reduce its cost of doing business by lowering the bribes it
pays to the tax inspector as much as possible (Figure 4 [2] and Table 1). Likewise, the
arrows at the top pointing to the left indicate that the government prefers high punish-
ment for the tax inspector as an indicator of its good governance (Figure 4, Manshaei
et al. 2013). However, in this case, the arrows point in both directions; that is, the PPP
firm and government seek high punishment (Figure 4 [1]). From the PPP firm’s per-
spective7, this is a Nash equilibrium satisfying:
pPPP qlo, aloð Þ < pPPP qhi, ahið Þ: (9)
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Using equation (1) yields:
p1  b qlo, aloð Þ þ TR1 < p1  b qhi, ahið Þ þ TR1  b qlo, aloð Þ < b qhi, ahið Þ:
Given equation (7):
 qlo þ aloð Þ <  qhi þ ahið Þ:
Finally, since q, a 2 ½0, 1, qhi ¼ 1qlo and ahi ¼ 1 alo are assumed and become:
 qlo þ aloð Þ< 2 qlo þ aloð Þð Þ
2 qlo þ aloð Þ<2:
Dividing by -2:
qlo þ alo < 1
w
However, a previous experiment demonstrates that monetary incentives and harsh
punishments (e.g., the higher punishment rate for the tax inspector) may not
strengthen tax compliance (Bitzenis, Vlachos, & Kontakos, 2015). In addition,
Cerqueti and Coppier (2016) confirm that most taxpayers and tax inspectors are not
worried about the punishment rate if fiscal corruption and discrimination among eth-
nic groups are prevalent. Thus, future research is needed to examine the effects of the
Figure 4. The Nash equilibrium based on the cluster of cooperation and the fiscal corruption. The
R-code is provided in appendix B.
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many various cultures of corruption such as the relationship between corruption and
social attitudes (Yingying & Min, 2018).
5. Conclusion
This study develops a theory linking the cyclicality of tax policy based on the Laffer
curve to solve public debt problems, aggregate productivity, and fiscal corruption.
This study differs from those in the existing literature by focusing on public debt
management (i.e., determining the bailout rate of NPLs) in countries promoting PPP
projects. The results indicate that tax policy can exacerbate the country’s output, as
the higher the number of PPP projects is, the lower the aggregate productivity is. In
other words, the patterns of the equilibria, which are between the aggregate product-
ivity and the Laffer curve, lack a direct link to fiscal corruption risk, though their
magnitude does. To illustrate, when the number of PPP projects in Laos jumped to
1,225 projects, the aggregate productivity dropped to near zero (see Figure 2). In add-
ition, the results indicate that applying a cluster of cooperation is a valid strategy to
prevent tax evasion and corruption in PPP schemes. Specifically, it is recommended
that sustainable sources of tax revenues should be based on the tax inspector’s cap-
acity rather than the punishment rate, particularly in the least developed countries
(L.D.C.s), which have less efficient tax systems. It would therefore be useful to exam-
ine the implications of cultural aspects in future research. Thus, policymakers design-
ing a tax system in the L.D.C.s could prioritise small deadweight losses over small
administrative burdens. For example, in many L.D.C.s, including Laos, the govern-
ment has begun to expand its electronic (e-tax) system nationwide this year in the
hope of reducing administrative costs and improving tax efficiency. The goal is to
solve fiscal corruption risk and tax evasion in Laos. This study examines the govern-
ment’s optimisation problem by abandoning the labour utility assumption of Camous
and Gimber (2018), thus introducing fiscal corruption risk into the model. In add-
ition, this study incorporates the PPP firm’s optimisation problem. However, there is
a limitation to using game theory to solve public policy problems. As Bitzenis et al.
(2015) observe, there is doubt about the acuracy of the players’ payoffs.
Notes
1. As in Laos, the State inspection authority found that many submitted PPP projects
overreport investment costs. For a seven-metre-wide double-deck asphalt pavement, some
projects cost as much as $1.8 million per kilometre, whereas others cost as much as $1.5
million. All of these exceed the standard unit price of between $600,000 and $750,000 per
kilometre (https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/5VUm-dN7ekqi-Vk0d5fG1w).
2. Bribery and corruption can be widespread in public investment programs (Svensson, 2005).
3. Aggregate productivity refers to output per efficiency unit of labour in the economy
(Heathcote, Storesletten, & Violante, 2017).
4. In the form of s1z1C1  TR1 þ G1  TR2RG :
5. We consider PPPs an alternative to solve economic problems (Engel et al., 2013), and
public debt management as in Laos (National Assembly, 2018).
6. Kip is Lao currency or LAK. Its exchange rate is roughly 8,200 LAK per US$1.
7. We view similar result from the perspective of a government involved.
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plot(Z1,type¼"l",col¼"2",lty ¼ 2, ylim¼ c(279698,5314286),xlab¼"Profit tax rate",
ylab¼"Tax revenues vs The aggregate productivity (unit: LAK Billion)", axes¼ F)
##
box()
axis(side ¼ 1, at¼ c(2, 4, 6, 8, 10),
labels¼ c(0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1))
axis(side ¼ 2, at¼ c(300000,1000000,3000000,5000000),













"The aggregate productivity when nPPP ¼ 8",
"The aggregate productivity when nPPP ¼ 1"),
col¼ c("1","2","3","4"), lty ¼ 1:4)
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Appendix B. The R-code of Figure 4














plot(p_PPP,type¼"l",col¼"2",lty ¼ 2, ylim¼ c(13949998,13949987),xlab¼"Profit tax rate",
ylab¼"PPP Firm’s Expected Profit (unit: LAK Million)",
main¼"(2) PPP Firm’s Objective Function", axes¼ F)
##
box()
axis(side ¼ 1, at¼ c(2, 4, 6, 8, 10),
labels¼ c(0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1))










legend("top",legend¼ c("With Low Punishment Rate ¼ 0.1",
"With High Punishment Rate ¼ 0.9"), col¼ c("2","3"), lty ¼ 2:3)







plot(GOV,type¼"l",col¼"2",lty ¼ 2, ylim¼ c(1248504810,1248503414),xlab¼"Profit tax rate",
ylab¼"Government Revenues (unit: LAK Million)",







axis(side ¼ 1, at¼ c(2, 4, 6, 8, 10),
labels¼ c(0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1))
axis(side ¼ 2, at¼ c(1248504810,1248505508,1248503414),
labels¼ c(1248504810,1248505508,1248503414))
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